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Abstract 
 
This paper documents our efforts in replicating Epstein’s (1998) demographic prisoner’s 
dilemma model. While, qualitatively speaking, our replicated model resembles the results of 
the original model reasonably well, statistical testing reveals that in quantitative terms our 
endeavor was only partially successful. This fact hints towards some unstated assumptions 
regarding the original model. Confronted with a number of ambiguous descriptions of model 
features we introduce a method for systematically generating a large number of model 
replications and testing for their equivalence to the original model. With the help of this 
approach we show that the original model was probably based on a number of dubious 
assumptions. Finally we conduct a number of statistical tests with respect to the influence of 
certain design choices like the method of updating, the timing of events and the randomization 
of the activation order. The results of these tests highlight the importance of an explicit 
documentation of design choices and especially of the timing of events. 
 
Key Words: Demographic, Prisoner’s Dilemma, Replication, Simulation, 
 Complex Adaptive Systems, Social Science Models 
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1. Introduction 
 
The evolution of cooperation between egoistic individuals has attracted the attention of 
researchers from a great number of disciplines ranging from biology over political science to 
economics. Out of this effort the branch of cooperation theory came into existence, 
spearheaded by Robert Axelrod’s groundbreaking works. Typically formulated as a prisoner’s 
dilemma, the quest usually consists of discovering sufficient circumstances to allow for the 
emergence of cooperation or of deriving strategies, which generate high utility in a variety of 
situations. 
While the common one shot-game leads to the outcome of mutual defection despite being an 
inferior solution, for repeated games Axelrod has shown Anatol Rapoport’s Tit-For-Tat (TFT) 
to be a highly efficient strategy since it fairs very well against cooperators and defectors alike. 
In another interesting twist Nowak and May (1993) tried to show within a spatial context that 
it’s possible to arrive at a cooperative solution with zero-memory-strategies as well. However, 
their results were later shown to be critically dependent on the timing of events (Huberman 
and Glance 1993). In the more plausible setting of asynchronous updating no clusters of 
cooperation were able to evolve. 
Epstein’s (1998) demographic prisoner’s dilemma (DPD) was yet another interesting take on 
the topic. Agents arranged on a torus are allowed to move freely and propagate. When they 
encounter another individual a round of prisoner’s dilemma is played. This comparably 
simple setup serves as a proof of existence for the evolution of cooperative clusters, although 
only zero memory-strategies are employed and agents cannot distinguish cooperators from 
defectors, i.e. they are tag-less. 
The goal of our work was to replicate the results of this model using the Repast framework for 
Java, but as the following report shows we succeeded only partially. Nevertheless, our efforts 
are instructive for a number of reasons, laid out in later sections. 
In the next section, Epstein’s demographic prisoner’s dilemma is presented in detail. Section 3 
deals with our replication efforts while section 4 summarizes our insights. In the closing 
section we discuss the implications of our results. 
 
2. Original Model 
 
The remarks in this section are completely based on Epstein’s (1998) model description. The 
demographic prisoner’s dilemma is played on a 30x30 matrix with wrapped-around borders, 
which topographically corresponds to a torus. Initially 100 agents are placed on random 
locations of the torus. Each of these agents is born with an initial endowment of resources and 
a fixed strategy; either Cooperate (C) or Defect (D). This strategy is randomly assigned during 
initialization with equal probabilities. Each turn every agent is allowed to move randomly to 
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an unoccupied site within his Von Neumann-neighborhood. If all neighboring sites are 
occupied, no movement takes place. 
If there happen to be other agents in the Von Neumann-neighborhood after the movement, the 
currently active agent plays one game of prisoner’s dilemma against each of them. As usual 
the payoff for mutual cooperation is R (reward) for both participants, P (punishment) for both 
agents in the case of mutual defection and if one agent cooperates while the other defects, the 
defector receives T (temptation) and the cooperator gets S (sucker’s payoff). The payoffs 
follow T > R > 0 > P > S and R > (T+S)/2. 
Payoffs accumulate and since some payoffs of the game form are negative, the total amount 
of an agent’s resources may turn negative. In this case, the agent dies instantly and is removed 
from the game. If, however, an agent’s resources exceed a given threshold, this agent may 
give birth to a new agent in his Von Neumann-neighborhood which is born in a random 
vacant neighboring site of the agent. The newborn agent inherits his parent’s strategy and is 
endowed with the aforementioned amount of initial resources. Should all sites within the 
neighborhood be occupied, giving birth is not possible. After an agent has completed all these 
steps, it is the next agent’s turn, and so forth, until all agents have been active. All agents 
having been activated once corresponds to one time period. 
This schedule resembles what is called asynchronous updating. Instead of assuming some 
kind of external timer, which synchronizes the individual actions, an agent takes all actions as 
soon as it’s his turn. The choice of updating schedule has been shown to be of the utmost 
importance by Huberman and Glance (1993). In their own words “if a computer simulation is 
to mimic a real world system with no global clock, it should contain procedures that ensure 
that the updating of the interacting entities is continuous and asynchronous. This entails 
choosing an interval of time small enough so that at each step at most one individual entitity 
is chosen at random to interact with its neighbors. During this update, the state of the rest of 
the system is held constant. This procedure is then repeated throughout the array for one 
player at a time, in contrast to a synchronous simulation in which all the entities are updated 
at once” (emphasis added). To avoid artifacts the order of activation is shuffled at the end of 
each period. 
Given these basic assumptions Epstein investigates the behavior of the model for five 
different settings. For Run 1 he assumes no maximum age so that agents may die only from 
the consequences of playing the prisoner’s dilemma. This first setting already proves his basic 
point that “cooperation can emerge and flourish in a population of tagless agents playing 
zero-memory fixed strategies of cooperate or defect in this demographic setting.” (emphasis 
in the original paper). After only a few periods a stable pattern emerges and cooperators 
dominate the landscape counting nearly 90 percent (800 out of 900 agents at the maximum on 
a 30x30 torus), while the defectors fill up the rest of the space. 
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Image 1: Exemplary image of Run 1, re‐implemented by Epstein in Ascape 
 
In Run 2 a maximum age is introduced so that agents may die of age as well. The maximum 
lifetime is set to 100 periods. This change leads to slight oscillations in the time series of 
numbers of cooperators and defectors but the mean values are not affected much. 
 
Image 2: Exemplary image of Run 2, re‐implemented by Epstein in Ascape 
 
Runs 3 and 4 change the payoff for mutual cooperation. In Run 3 R is decreased from 5 to 2. 
The effect of this change is an accentuation of the oscillatory dynamics. Furthermore, 
defectors fare comparatively better (on average counting about 200 agents) and cooperators 
do worse, ranging from 250 to 450 agents. Run 4 decreases R further down to 1 which 
pronounces the oscillatory dynamics even more, resembling predator-prey-cycles between the 
defectors and the cooperators. Because of these extreme oscillations Run 4 leads to a number 
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of different outcomes depending on the random seed. In some runs, cooperators dominate the 
scene while in others they die out (soon followed by the defectors who then have no prey). 
Finally, in Run 5 Epstein introduces mutation while setting R to its original value of 5 to 
investigate the stability of the emergence of cooperation. Until now offspring inherited the 
fixed strategy from his parent. Mutation is defined “as the probability that an agent will have a 
strategy different from its parent’s.” The mutation rate is set to 50 percent. Still, cooperation 
persists despite pronounced oscillatory dynamics. 
 
Image 3: Exemplary image of Run 5, re‐implemented by Epstein in Ascape 
3. Replication 
 
Although agent-based models are clearly on the rise as a modeling tool, with but a few 
exceptions most of these models have not been replicated or replications haven’t been 
published. It is only in recent years that the importance of the replication of agent-based 
models is recognized and the problems associated with it are acknowledged. The original 
model and the replicated model may differ along many dimensions which complicates the 
process of replication. Wilensky and Rand (2007) have suggested a list of items to be 
included in publications of replication. We follow their suggestions and list our details in 
Table 1. In the case of multiple choice-issues we highlighted our choice with bold typeset. 
 
Standard 
Numerical identity 
Distributional equivalence 
Relational alignment 
Focal measures Number of cooperators, number of defectors 
Level of communication 
None (original author didn’t answer our 
request) 
Brief email contact 
Rich discussion and personal meetings 
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Familiarity with language/toolkit of original model 
(C++) 
None 
Surface understanding 
Have built other models in this language/toolkit 
Examination of source code 
None 
Referred to for particular questions 
Studied in-depth 
Exposure to original implemented model 
None 
Run2 
Re-ran original experiments 
Ran experiments other than the original ones 
Exploration of parameter space Only examined results from original paper Examined other areas of the parameter space 
 
Table 2: Details of replication 
 
The original model was written in C++ (a reimplementation for AScape is available in Epstein 
(2007) – cf. footnote 2). Our replication was realized with the Repast 3.1 framework for Java.  
As stated in Table 1 we aimed for distributional equivalence which Axtell et al. (1996) 
defined as two models producing distributions of results that cannot be distinguished 
statistically. We compared the results of both models in respect to the numbers of cooperators 
and defectors for Runs 1 and 2 by using t-tests for the equality of means of two samples with 
the same unknown variance – an approach already used, for instance, by Wilensky and Rand 
(2007). 
Since we didn’t get into touch with the author of the original model we had no exposure to the 
original source code and had to base our replication efforts solely on the verbal description of 
the model given in Epstein (1998). 
The first version of our reimplementation matched the reported results reasonably well with 
respect to the qualitative behavior of the original model for all five runs given in the original 
paper, although our model showed much more pronounced oscillatory dynamics. Statistical 
testing revealed that our results didn’t reproduce the ones of the original model. So we went 
back to the verbal description and looked for clues where we could have gone wrong or 
possibly misinterpreted Epstein’s assumptions. We identified a number of issues that we were 
not able to draw clear conclusions from. Additionally we wanted to test for a number of 
assumptions which we a priori assumed to be inconsequential (either because it has been 
stated so explicitly in the original article or because in fact they shouldn’t matter anyway), but 
regarded as interesting tests nevertheless. We arrived at seven assumptions we wanted to test 
in a systematical way: 
1. Timing of the removal of dead agents: In our first naïve implementation of the 
demographic prisoner’s dilemma we assumed that dead agents are removed from the 
torus at the end of each period. This contradicts the assumption of asynchronous 
updating and may have considerable influence on the results, since the dead agents 
may fill up the space where other agents tried to give birth to offspring. So we 
introduced the option to remove a dead agent exactly at the moment of his death. 
                                                            
2 We ran a reimplementation of the model provided with the accompanying CD of Epstein (2007) a few times. 
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2. Timing of the death of agents: Also connected with the issue of the death of agents 
was the question whether an agent may die although it is not his turn. This may 
happen if the active agent plays a game of prisoner’s dilemma against the agent in 
question and as a result of this game the latter agent’s accumulated payoff drops below 
zero. Although our first implementation already considered this “passive death” we 
allowed for an option that an agent doesn’t die until he is activated next time. 
3. Origin of initial endowment: When an agent’s accumulated payoff exceeds a certain 
threshold, he may give birth to an offspring. The newborn agent starts with an initial 
endowment of six resources. We asked whether this initial endowment is inherited 
directly from the parent (i.e. subtracted from his accumulated payoff) or if the new 
agent receives this amount of resources without being taken from his parent. 
4. Birth age: Here, the original article was a little bit ambiguous stating that “[a]n 
agent’s initial age is a random integer between one and the maximum age.” We were 
not quite sure if this concerned only the initial population of 100 agents or if offspring 
born during the simulation started with a random birth age as well. So, though it seems 
counter-intuitive, we included an option for random birth age as well. 
5. Updating mechanism: Although the article explicitly emphasizes the use of 
asynchronous updating, we thought it to be an instructive lesson to investigate the 
extent of differences in the results when alternatively allowing for synchronous 
updating. The inclusion of this option was additionally motivated by the fact that the 
Ascape-reimplementation of this model provided by Epstein (2007), allowed for 
“execution by agent” as well as “execution by rule”, which seem to be labels for 
synchronous and asynchronous updating, respectively. 
6. Random number generator: When coding in Repast for Java you have the choice 
between two random number generators, Repasts CERN Random Library and Java’s 
own random library. We were quite curious if the choice the of random number 
generator might have an effect on the results and therefore included an option to 
choose one of these two libraries. 
7. Randomization of the order of activation: Epstein explicitly describes his method of 
shuffling the activation order of agents: “Agent objects are held in a doubly linked list 
and are processed serially. If there are N agents, a pair of agents is selected at random 
and the agents swap positions in the list. This random swapping is done N/2 times 
after each cycle.” Our first implementation disregarded this explicit description and 
for matters of convenience made use of Repast’s own method for shuffling lists which, 
according to the Repast documentation, shuffles a list “… by iterating backwards 
through the list and swapping the current item with a randomly chosen item. This 
randomly chosen item will occur before the current item in the list.“ We thought that 
this might have as well been a reason for the divergence in results and included an 
option to switch between Repast’s shuffling method and the one described by Epstein. 
We formulated each of these points as a binary parameter for our model being either true or 
false. The exact meaning of each value of the parameters is given in Table 2. 
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No. Name in the model TRUE FALSE 
1 Remove dead agents immediately 
An agent is removed at the 
moment he dies either of age or as 
a result of playing the prisoner’s 
dilemma. 
Dead agents are removed at the 
end of each period after all 
agents have been active. 
2 Die immediately 
An agent dies immediately when 
his accumulated resources drop 
below zero. This can also happen 
when it’s not the agent’s turn as a 
result of another active agent 
playing the prisoner’s dilemma 
with the former. 
An agent can only die while 
being active. In consequence, if 
his resources drop below zero 
when it’s not his turn, he dies not 
immediately but only the next 
time after taking his turn. 
3 Initial endowment inherited 
The initial endowment of a new 
offspring is subtracted from his 
parent. 
The initial endowment of a new 
offspring is independent from his 
parent’s and not subtracted from 
the latter’s. 
4 Random birth age 
A new born agent’s initial age is a 
random integer between one and 
the maximum age. 
A new born agent’s initial age is 
set to one. 
5 Asynchronous updating 
If an agent is active he performs all 
possible steps before it’s the next 
agent’s turn. 
In each period, first all agents 
move, then all agents play 
against all of their neighbors. 
Afterwards all agents give birth 
to offspring if possible. 
6 CERN Random Repast’s own random library is used. 
Java’s own random library is 
used. 
7 Repast List-Shuffle 
Repast’s own method for shuffling 
lists is used for shuffling the 
activation order of agents at the 
end of each period. 
The activation order of agents is 
shuffled according to Epstein’s 
algorithm. 
 
Table 3: Description of the binary parameters 
 
Testing for all possible combinations of these seven binary options leads to 27=128 different 
settings to be investigated or more precisely to 128*2*30=7680 runs of the model (2 because 
of testing Epstein’s settings called Runs 1 and 2 and 30 because in the original model each 
setting was repeated 30 times to eliminate the role of the random seed. We adopted this 
measure.) These 128 different candidate models are then tested by means of t-tests. By 
process of elimination of those cases where the equality of means-hypothesis can be rejected, 
we arrive at those solutions which approximate the original model reasonably well. 
The pseudo code of our replication is given in Table 3 and Table 4 for asynchronous and 
synchronous updating, respectively. The presented cases assume option “Remove dead agents 
immediately” to be false. For the case of this option being true, the removal of agents occurs 
as soon as an agent dies, whether of age or from the result of playing the prisoner’s dilemma. 
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Initialize model 
DO t times 
    FOR EACH agent DO 
        Move 
        Play against all Von Neumann-neighbors in random order 
        IF resources < 0 THEN 
            Die 
        END IF 
        FOR EACH neighbor of agent DO 
            IF resources < 0 THEN 
                Die 
            END IF 
        END FOR EACH 
        Give birth to offspring if possible 
        IF age >= maximum age THEN 
            Die 
        END IF 
    END FOR EACH 
    Remove dead agents from the space 
    FOR EACH agent DO 
        Age increases by 1 
    END FOR EACH 
    Shuffle activation order of agents 
END DO 
 
Table 4: Pseudo code in the case of asynchronous updating 
 
Initialize model 
DO t times 
    FOR EACH agent DO 
        Move 
    END FOR EACH 
    FOR EACH agent DO 
        Play against all Von Neumann-neighbors in random order 
        IF resources < 0 THEN 
            Die 
        END IF 
        FOR EACH neighbor of agent DO 
            IF resources < 0 THEN 
                Die 
            END IF 
        END FOR EACH 
    END FOR EACH 
    FOR EACH agent DO 
        Give birth to offspring if possible 
    END FOR EACH 
    FOR EACH agent DO 
        IF age >= maximum age THEN 
            Die 
        END IF 
    END FOR EACH 
    Remove dead agents from the space 
    FOR EACH agent DO 
        Age increases by 1 
    END FOR EACH 
    Shuffle activation order of agents 
END DO 
 
Table 5: Pseudo code in the case of synchronous updating 
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To level out the influence of the random element we conducted 30 runs per combination of 
true/false-values for the binary parameters; each time using different random seeds for the 
random number generator for each model corresponding to the parameter settings of Runs 1 
and 2. As in the original model we sampled the numbers of cooperators and defectors at t=500 
and calculated the mean and the standard deviation which we then tested against the values of 
the original model by means of a t-test. The results of this endeavor are summarized in the 
following section. 
 
4. Results 
 
Regarding Run 1, for 127 of the 128 cases tested, the null hypotheses of equality of means 
could be rejected for the number of cooperators or the number of defectors at α = 0.05. So 
only one parameter combination remains that isn’t statistically distinguishable from the 
original model with respect to both focal measures. We are very confident, however, to claim, 
that this candidate solution is radically different from the original model, for it assumes 
synchronous updating, while Epstein explicitly emphasizes the use of asynchronous updating. 
Details for this case are given in Table 5. The table reports the averaged values over 30 runs 
and additionally the respective standard deviations in parentheses. The results of the 
replicated model are rounded. Furthermore, the results of the t-tests on the equality of means 
are reported. For the results of all 128 cases we refer the reader to the appendix (Tables A-1 
and A-2). 
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Original Model (Run 1) 
No. Coop.  No. Def.  
779 (15)  121 (15)  
Replicated Model (Run 1) 
No. Coop. t-Value No. Def. t-Value 
F F F T F F T 785 (16) -1,63 114 (16) 1,65 
 
Table 6: Details of statistical testing for Run 1 
 
Although having discovered one candidate solution the results of which can’t be distinguished 
from the original model, we can say that our goal of achieving distributional equivalence was 
not attained with respect to Run 1. 
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Image 4: Exemplary Image of Run 1, re‐implemented in Repast 3.1/Java 
 
For Run 2 we were able to reject the null hypothesis in 121 of 128 cases, leaving seven cases 
where the results are statistically indistinguishable from the original model. The details of 
these seven cases are presented in Table 6. 
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 Original Model (Run 2) 
No. Coop.  No. Def.  
784 (29)  99 (25)  
Replicated Model (Run 2) 
No. Coop. t-Value No. Def. t-Value 
T T F T T T T 796 (24) -1,70 110 (24) -1,67 
T F T F T T T 788 (27) -0,50 111 (27) -1,77 
F T T T T T F 789 (24) -0,79 88 (22) 1,86 
F T T T T F F 787 (29) -0,44 90 (26) 1,30 
F T F T T F F 780 (25) 0,53 97 (22) 0,28 
F F T T T F T 773 (23) 1,61 103 (21) -0,66 
F F F T T T T 769 (31) 1,98 108 (27) -1,28 
 
Table 7: Details of statistical testing for Run 2 
 
Since we are interested in finding a model with a close fit to the original model, lower t-
values are desirable. By far the best result is achieved by the parameter combination reported 
in the fifth row of the table (highlighted in bold typeset). The respective solution shares some 
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features with the majority of candidate solutions making it even more probable that the 
respective parameters resemble the choices undertaken in the original model. 
As expected, all cases resembling the results of the original model employ asynchronous 
updating. A little bit more surprising is the result that in the majority of the candidate 
solutions agents are born with a random birth age. The meaningfulness of this assumption is 
very dubious if the propagation process is to resemble giving birth3. Another problematic 
result of our extensive testing is that in the majority of successful replications of Run 2, dead 
agents are not removed immediately at the time of death but are removed only at the end of 
each period collectively. This result is problematic insofar as it contradicts the approach of 
asynchronous updating to some degree. 
Unfortunately, we were not able to find a single parameter combination which is capable of 
reproducing the results of Runs 1 and 2 of the original model at once. This fact hints to 
additional assumptions regarding Run 1 which were not stated in Epstein (1998) or to put it 
differently that the results of Run 1 were achieved by a slightly different model than those of 
Run 2. 
 
Image 4: Exemplary Image of Run 2, re‐implemented in Repast 3.1/Java 
 
The large quantity of data produced in the course of replicating the model led us to the idea to 
conduct further series of tests regarding the influence of each binary parameter ceteris paribus 
on the outcomes. Holding six of the seven parameters constant, we compared the two models 
with the seventh parameter being true and false, respectively with the t-test introduced above. 
This procedure was repeated for all seven parameters and all combinations of the six 
remaining parameters amounting to 64 tests per Run and parameter. To illustrate this more 
vividly, let’s consider one specific test on the importance of the parameter remove dead 
                                                            
3 In his Ascape-Reimplementation, Epstein (2007) no longer calls the propagation process giving birth but calls 
it fissioning instead (Model Settings Screen, Rules Section). 
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immediately. Adopting the order of parameters employed in the tables above we have to test 
26=64 different combinations of binary parameters having remove dead immediately = true 
against their counterparts having remove dead immediately = false. 
We present only a number of insights gained from this series of tests. For instance, the 
parameter random birth age confirms what could have been expected a priori. It has no 
influence at all on the outcomes of Run 1 (rejecting only 3 of 64 tests) since this run assumes 
no maximum age and therefore the birth age doesn’t matter at all. For Run 2, however, the 
results vary significantly and produce different outcomes for 54 of the 64 cases. This serves as 
an interesting example of model validation by means of statistical testing. 
A similarly clear picture emerges from the tests on the influence of the updating mechanism. 
In this instance, the equality of means-null hypotheses is rejected in all cases of Run 1 and 
Run 2 giving additional weight to the importance of choosing the right updating mechanism 
for the modeling problem at hand. The case is similar with respect to the parameter remove 
dead immediately. For the vast majority of parameter combinations (57 of 64 for Run 1, 60 of 
64 for Run 2) the samples show a significant difference. The effect is a little bit less 
pronounced in the case of the parameter die immediately. Still, 45 of 64 parameter 
combinations show a significant difference for Run 1 and even 51 of 64 parameter 
combinations do so for Run 2. What these three parameters have in common is that they all 
deal with the timing of events within the model. All these three assumptions concern only the 
exact point of time during the same global time step when a given procedure should be 
executed and yet the results vary dramatically. This points out the high importance of 
explicitly stating the course of events in an agent-based model – for instance by means of a 
detailed pseudo code4 – in order to be replicable. 
For the assumption about the origin of an offspring’s initial endowment the picture is not as 
clear as in the above cases. For Run 2, 26 out of 64 cases show no significant differences in 
the results, depending on the origin of the initial endowment and therefore it is hard to draw 
some decisive conclusions. For Run 1, however, the vast majority (61 of 64 cases) varies 
significantly when changing the parameter.  
As also might have been expected, the choice of random library bears no influence on the 
results. While this might seem common sense, it is nevertheless reassuring that extensive 
statistical testing confirms this assumption. The case is a little bit different with the choice of 
a shuffling-algorithm. While for Run 1, this choice has a significant influence on the results in 
only a minority of cases (14 of 64 cases), Run 2 is affected 32 out of 64 times by the choice of 
the algorithm showing that the choice of the shuffling algorithm may be consequential to the 
outcomes of the model and should therefore be well documented. 
 
                                                            
4 While writing this paper we realized that pseudo code is as prone to ambiguities as plain verbal description, if it 
is not used with great care for details. However, pseudo code forces the modeler to state the order of events in a 
strictly sequential way. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
While we haven’t achieved our goal of distributional equivalence for Runs 1 and 2 at once, 
we were able to replicate the demographic prisoner’s dilemma reasonably well regarding Run 
2. This outcome hints to unstated assumptions regarding the description of the original setting 
of Run 1, without which it is not possible to realize a successful replication of the original 
model. 
By systematic testing of various parameter settings we confirmed that the original model 
employs asynchronous updating. On the other hand it turned out that it is highly likely, that in 
the original implementation not only the initial 100 agents start with a random age between 
one and the given maximum age but also new born agents are initialized with a random age. 
We doubt the meaningfulness of this assumption within the context of the model and 
furthermore showed that setting the birth age to one for all new born agents produces 
significantly different results for Run 2. 
Another problematic insight is that in the original model dead agents probably were removed 
from the torus collectively at the end of each period and not at the immediate moment of their 
death. Not only have we shown that the timing of removal has significant influence on the 
results, removing the dead agents at the end of the period is also a breach of the assumption of 
asynchronous updating. Nevertheless, we have been able to verify the qualitative results of the 
original model that cooperation prevails under a wide variety of circumstances. 
Further testing of our results revealed the importance of the timing of events in an agent-based 
model, highlighting the usefulness of explicitly stating the course of events, for instance by 
means of pseudo code documenting all critical aspects of the model. Furthermore, we 
confirmed the assumption that the choice of random library has no influences whatsoever on 
the average results of our replication. The choice of shuffling algorithm, however, does have 
significant influence in a non-negligible number of cases. 
We think that our approach of modeling ambiguous assumptions as binary parameters and 
systematically testing them is a valuable method for the replication of agent-based models 
which makes extensive use of the verbal description of the model to be replicated as well as 
the available data. In combination with statistical testing this procedure allows for some kind 
of reverse engineering when detailed information on the original model is not readily 
available. 
Nevertheless, we are aware that this method is not free of shortcomings. First, turning 
ambiguous features into a binary parameter may not always be possible. Second, and even 
more important, the number of cases to be tested increases exponentially with the binary 
parameters and therefore our method can only be applied with respect to a selected number of 
model features, before the evaluation of the generated data turns into an arduous task. 
Objections might also be raised against our reliance on t-tests refraining from a more detailed 
comparison between the results of the model and of the replication. But for the goal at hand 
and for the process of elimination of candidate solutions a test on the equality of means is by 
  16 
all means adequate. Despite these objections we believe this approach to be a helpful guide in 
the course of model replication. 
  17 
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Table A‐1: Results of the replication of Run 1 
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 Original Model (Run 1) 
No. Coop.  No. Def.  
779 (15)  121 (15)  
Replicated Model (Run 1) 
No. Coop. t-Value No. Def. t-Value 
1 T T T T T T T 755 (16) 6,01 145 (16) -5,98 
2 T T T T T T F 749 (21) 6,21 150 (21) -6,18 
3 T T T T T F T 759 (19) 4,48 117 (14) 1,18 
4 T T T T T F F 747 (16) 8,19 153 (16) -8,17 
5 T T T T F T T 715 (35) 9,33 185 (34) -9,34 
6 T T T T F T F 709 (21) 14,77 191 (21) -14,70 
7 T T T T F F T 717 (23) 12,26 183 (23) -12,24 
8 T T T T F F F 709 (17) 16,72 191 (17) -16,59 
9 T T T F T T T 758 (14) 5,43 142 (14) -5,43 
10 T T T F T T F 751 (16) 7,01 149 (16) -6,95 
11 T T T F T F T 754 (14) 6,67 146 (14) -6,63 
12 T T T F T F F 747 (15) 8,23 153 (15) -8,20 
13 T T T F F T T 723 (21) 11,86 177 (21) -11,81 
14 T T T F F T F 711 (30) 11,21 189 (29) -11,20 
15 T T T F F F T 729 (25) 9,57 171 (24) -9,58 
16 T T T F F F F 714 (29) 11,10 186 (29) -11,07 
17 T T F T T T T 731 (17) 11,66 169 (17) -11,64 
18 T T F T T T F 724 (20) 12,02 176 (20) -12,02 
19 T T F T T F T 727 (18) 12,16 173 (18) -12,14 
20 T T F T T F F 724 (18) 12,98 176 (18) -12,94 
21 T T F T F T T 685 (31) 14,92 215 (31) -14,90 
22 T T F T F T F 675 (36) 14,60 225 (36) -14,59 
23 T T F T F F T 675 (33) 15,51 225 (34) -15,42 
24 T T F T F F F 678 (29) 16,69 222 (30) -16,64 
25 T T F F T T T 730 (15) 12,46 170 (15) -12,47 
26 T T F F T T F 728 (22) 10,49 172 (22) -10,44 
27 T T F F T F T 729 (16) 12,30 171 (16) -12,29 
28 T T F F T F F 728 (17) 12,02 171 (17) -12,01 
29 T T F F F T T 675 (25) 19,46 225 (25) -19,57 
30 T T F F F T F 660 (24) 23,35 240 (24) -23,29 
31 T T F F F F T 678 (30) 16,67 222 (30) -16,73 
32 T T F F F F F 675 (33) 15,80 225 (33) -15,85 
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Table A‐1 continued: Results of the replication of Run 1 
Se
tt
in
g 
N
o.
 
R
em
ov
e 
D
ea
d 
A
ge
nt
s 
Im
m
ed
ia
te
ly
 
D
ie
 Im
m
ed
ia
te
ly
 
In
iti
al
 E
nd
ow
m
en
t 
In
he
ri
te
d 
R
an
do
m
 B
ir
th
 A
ge
 
A
sy
nc
hr
on
ou
s 
U
pd
at
in
g 
C
E
R
N
 R
an
do
m
 
R
ep
as
t L
is
t-
Sh
uf
fle
 Original Model (Run 1) 
No. Coop.  No. Def.  
779 (15)  121 (15)  
Replicated Model (Run 1) 
No. Coop. t-Value No. Def. t-Value 
33 T F T T T T T 752 (14) 7,33 148 (14) -7,31 
34 T F T T T T F 743 (16) 9,07 156 (16) -9,01 
35 T F T T T F T 748 (19) 7,06 151 (18) -7,04 
36 T F T T T F F 743 (15) 9,29 157 (15) -9,21 
37 T F T T F T T 693 (27) 15,28 207 (27) -15,22 
38 T F T T F T F 682 (26) 17,55 218 (26) -17,51 
39 T F T T F F T 692 (28) 15,09 208 (28) -15,10 
40 T F T T F F F 681 (33) 14,74 218 (33) -14,76 
41 T F T F T T T 749 (13) 8,42 151 (13) -8,40 
42 T F T F T T F 744 (19) 7,81 156 (19) -7,79 
43 T F T F T F T 748 (14) 8,08 152 (14) -8,07 
44 T F T F T F F 743 (10) 10,77 156 (10) -10,73 
45 T F T F F T T 699 (23) 15,86 201 (23) -15,86 
46 T F T F F T F 689 (20) 19,84 211 (20) -19,85 
47 T F T F F F T 687 (23) 18,19 213 (23) -18,11 
48 T F T F F F F 690 (27) 15,80 210 (27) -15,81 
49 T F F T T T T 730 (15) 12,84 170 (15) -12,84 
50 T F F T T T F 721 (17) 13,89 178 (17) -13,80 
51 T F F T T F T 732 (11) 13,72 168 (11) -13,69 
52 T F F T T F F 725 (16) 13,41 175 (16) -13,37 
53 T F F T F T T 662 (28) 20,04 237 (28) -20,06 
54 T F F T F T F 641 (34) 20,34 258 (34) -20,33 
55 T F F T F F T 662 (31) 18,52 237 (31) -18,41 
56 T F F T F F F 652 (21) 26,85 247 (21) -26,85 
57 T F F F T T T 731 (19) 10,92 169 (19) -10,89 
58 T F F F T T F 726 (18) 12,54 174 (17) -12,52 
59 T F F F T F T 729 (15) 13,06 171 (15) -13,03 
60 T F F F T F F 726 (13) 14,55 174 (13) -14,39 
61 T F F F F T T 642 (32) 21,09 258 (32) -21,08 
62 T F F F F T F 651 (32) 19,64 249 (32) -19,74 
63 T F F F F F T 656 (31) 19,46 244 (31) -19,48 
64 T F F F F F F 651 (28) 22,03 249 (28) -22,16 
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Table A‐1 continued: Results of the replication of Run 1 
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 Original Model (Run 1) 
No. Coop.  No. Def.  
779 (15)  121 (15)  
Replicated Model (Run 1) 
No. Coop. t-Value No. Def. t-Value 
65 F T T T T T T 746 (17) 7,78 152 (17) -7,50 
66 F T T T T T F 737 (21) 8,86 161 (21) -8,61 
67 F T T T T F T 750 (19) 6,41 149 (19) -6,27 
68 F T T T T F F 736 (22) 8,80 162 (21) -8,57 
69 F T T T F T T 810 (10) -9,32 90 (10) 9,38 
70 F T T T F T F 811 (14) -8,75 89 (14) 8,76 
71 F T T T F F T 812 (13) -8,90 88 (13) 8,95 
72 F T T T F F F 807 (15) -7,20 93 (15) 7,26 
73 F T T F T T T 745 (19) 7,54 154 (19) -7,40 
74 F T T F T T F 737 (17) 10,15 162 (17) -9,90 
75 F T T F T F T 752 (16) 6,81 147 (16) -6,63 
76 F T T F T F F 709 (135) 2,81 159 (35) -5,56 
77 F T T F F T T 810 (14) -8,25 90 (14) 8,25 
78 F T T F F T F 813 (13) -9,35 87 (13) 9,35 
79 F T T F F F T 813 (14) -9,11 87 (13) 9,15 
80 F T T F F F F 809 (11) -8,93 91 (11) 8,93 
81 F T F T T T T 726 (15) 13,44 172 (16) -12,97 
82 F T F T T T F 718 (24) 11,58 180 (24) -11,39 
83 F T F T T F T 717 (18) 14,48 181 (17) -14,45 
84 F T F T T F F 710 (21) 14,87 188 (20) -14,79 
85 F T F T F T T 804 (11) -7,24 96 (11) 7,26 
86 F T F T F T F 801 (12) -6,51 98 (11) 6,56 
87 F T F T F F T 802 (10) -7,02 98 (10) 7,07 
88 F T F T F F F 794 (12) -4,35 106 (12) 4,37 
89 F T F F T T T 723 (17) 13,57 175 (17) -13,31 
90 F T F F T T F 720 (19) 13,44 178 (18) -13,19 
91 F T F F T F T 726 (17) 12,69 173 (17) -12,40 
92 F T F F T F F 710 (20) 15,05 188 (20) -14,96 
93 F T F F F T T 796 (18) -3,94 104 (18) 3,98 
94 F T F F F T F 800 (16) -5,25 100 (16) 5,31 
95 F T F F F F T 803 (12) -6,86 97 (12) 6,88 
96 F T F F F F F 800 (12) -5,86 100 (12) 5,89 
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Table A‐1 continued: Results of the replication of Run 1 
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 Original Model (Run 1) 
No. Coop.  No. Def.  
779 (15)  121 (15)  
Replicated Model (Run 1) 
No. Coop. t-Value No. Def. t-Value 
97 F T T T T T T 724 (18) 13,06 175 (17) -12,85 
98 F T T T T T F 711 (15) 17,78 187 (14) -17,65 
99 F T T T T F T 724 (19) 12,43 175 (18) -12,38 
100 F T T T T F F 716 (22) 13,21 182 (21) -13,06 
101 F T T T F T T 794 (13) -4,01 106 (13) 4,06 
102 F T T T F T F 797 (16) -4,49 103 (16) 4,52 
103 F T T T F F T 793 (12) -3,90 107 (12) 3,91 
104 F T T T F F F 795 (11) -4,55 105 (11) 4,55 
105 F T T F T T T 726 (16) 13,06 172 (16) -12,79 
106 F F T F T T F 721 (23) 11,57 177 (22) -11,43 
107 F F T F T F T 720 (21) 12,45 178 (21) -12,21 
108 F F T F T F F 708 (17) 17,19 189 (16) -16,88 
109 F F T F F T T 798 (14) -5,03 102 (14) 5,05 
110 F F T F F T F 802 (10) -6,84 98 (10) 6,86 
111 F F T F F F T 795 (14) -4,42 105 (14) 4,43 
112 F F T F F F F 800 (11) -6,28 100 (10) 6,34 
113 F F F T T T T 700 (18) 18,61 198 (18) -18,25 
114 F F F T T T F 685 (22) 19,70 212 (21) -19,52 
115 F F F T T F T 705 (16) 18,45 193 (16) -18,06 
116 F F F T T F F 693 (21) 18,34 204 (21) -17,71 
117 F F F T F T T 788 (12) -2,69 112 (12) 2,74 
118 F F F T F T F 788 (14) -2,38 112 (13) 2,43 
119 F F F T F F T 785 (16) -1,63 144 (16) 1,65 
120 F F F T F F F 790 (11) -3,05 110 (11) 3,08 
121 F F F F T T T 707 (17) 17,68 191 (16) -17,42 
122 F F F F T T F 688 (23) 18,08 209 (22) -17,83 
123 F F F F T F T 706 (19) 16,50 192 (18) -16,38 
124 F F F F T F F 700 (22) 16,50 197 (20) -16,44 
125 F F F F F T T 789 (14) -2,56 111 (14) 2,61 
126 F F F F F T F 788 (13) -2,47 112 (13) 2,50 
127 F F F F F F T 787 (13) -2,13 113 (13) 2,17 
128 F F F F F F F 792 (11) -3,88 108 (11) 3,91 
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Table A‐2: Results of the replication of Run 2 
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 Original Model (Run 2) 
No. Coop.  No. Def.  
784 (29)  99 (25)  
Replicated Model (Run 2) 
No. Coop. t-Value No. Def. t-Value 
1 T T T T T T T 804 (26) -2,80 100 (26) -0,19 
2 T T T T T T F 794 (22) -1,56 115 (24) -2,49 
3 T T T T T F T 812 (21) -4,32 91 (21) 1,33 
4 T T T T T F F 809 (22) -3,81 100 (23) -0,10 
5 T T T T F T T 467 (28) 43,38 431 (21) -55,70 
6 T T T T F T F 468 (22) 47,21 433 (16) -62,05 
7 T T T T F F T 472 (24) 45,58 428 (19) -57,29 
8 T T T T F F F 467 (17) 51,37 435 (16) -61,71 
9 T T T F T T T 735 (26) 6,91 164 (25) -10,02 
10 T T T F T T F 726 (20) 8,92 173 (21) -12,45 
11 T T T F T F T 735 (23) 7,31 165 (23) -10,67 
12 T T T F T F F 724 (21) 9,25 175 (21) -12,72 
13 T T T F F T T 473 (33) 38,66 412 (29) -44,92 
14 T T T F F T F 463 (32) 40,93 421 (27) -47,66 
15 T T T F F F T 473 (17) 50,79 414 (15) -59,38 
16 T T T F F F F 455 (22) 49,88 427 (20) -56,50 
17 T T F T T T T 796 (24) -1,70 110 (24) -1,67 
18 T T F T T T F 787 (31) -0,37 124 (30) -3,44 
19 T T F T T F T 799 (27) -2,06 106 (28) -0,95 
20 T T F T T F F 788 (29) -0,52 124 (30) -3,46 
21 T T F T F T T 431 (31) 45,66 462 (19) -62,96 
22 T T F T F T F 416 (29) 49,25 475 (22) -61,32 
23 T T F T F F T 430 (27) 48,90 467 (22) -60,28 
24 T T F T F F F 424 (28) 49,06 471 (22) -61,68 
25 T T F F T T T 715 (22) 10,42 184 (22) -14,03 
26 T T F F T T F 691 (23) 13,72 207 (23) -17,34 
27 T T F F T F T 710 (26) 10,34 189 (26) -13,65 
28 T T F F T F F 699 (30) 11,25 200 (29) -14,46 
29 T T F F F T T 428 (20) 55,58 453 (16) -65,42 
30 T T F F F T F 414 (30) 48,32 465 (25) -56,75 
31 T T F F F F T 418 (21) 56,33 459 (16) -66,27 
32 T T F F F F F 415 (19) 58,71 464 (16) -67,49 
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Table A‐2 continued: Results of the replication of Run 2 
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 Original Model (Run 2) 
No. Coop.  No. Def.  
784 (29)  99 (25)  
Replicated Model (Run 2) 
No. Coop. t-Value No. Def. t-Value 
33 T F T T T T T 844 (21) -9,19 52 (20) 8,09 
34 T F T T T T F 834 (17) -8,18 61 (17) 6,90 
35 T F T T T F T 845 (16) -10,14 51 (15) 9,15 
36 T F T T T F F 832 (26) -6,76 64 (25) 5,44 
37 T F T T F T T 470 (25) 44,96 426 (16) -60,26 
38 T F T T F T F 464 (25) 45,73 435 (21) -56,82 
39 T F T T F F T 477 (26) 43,07 422 (22) -53,37 
40 T F T T F F F 468 (27) 43,99 426 (19) -57,39 
41 T F T F T T T 788 (27) -0,50  111 (27) -1,77 
42 T F T F T T F 753 (21) 4,75 144 (20) -7,69 
43 T F T F T F T 783 (21) 0,20 116 (21) -2,81 
44 T F T F T F F 758 (30) 3,44 139 (28) -5,84 
45 T F T F F T T 475 (24) 44,87 410 (21) -52,41 
46 T F T F F T F 463 (20) 50,10 420 (18) -57,48 
47 T F T F F F T 472 (20) 48,38 413 (19) -55,36 
48 T F T F F F F 457 (24) 47,91 425 (20) -55,75 
49 T F F T T T T 841 (21) -8,61 55 (21) 7,36 
50 T F F T T T F 813 (20) -4,60 82 (19) 3,01 
51 T F F T T F T 836 (17) -8,43 60 (16) 7,11 
52 T F F T T F F 819 (25) -4,94 76 (24) 3,63 
53 T F F T F T T 432 (28) 47,59 457 (22) -59,19 
54 T F F T F T F 434 (26) 49,50 460 (21) -60,50 
55 T F F T F F T 434 (22) 52,72 461 (19) -63,61 
56 T F F T F F F 436 (27) 48,21 459 (21) -59,90 
57 T F F F T T T 768 (21) 2,48 131 (21) -5,38 
58 T F F F T T F 733 (20) 7,90 164 (20) -11,10 
59 T F F F T F T 766 (22) 2,69 132 (22) -5,47 
60 T F F F T F F 737 (21) 7,16 160 (20) -10,35 
61 T F F F F T T 434 (20) 54,55 448 (17) -62,95 
62 T F F F F T F 422 (20) 56,42 457 (16) -66,46 
63 T F F F F F T 435 (19) 55,28 446 (17) -63,21 
64 T F F F F F F 427 (25) 50,94 454 (22) -58,69 
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Table A‐2 continued: Results of the replication of Run 2 
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 Original Model (Run 2) 
No. Coop.  No. Def.  
784 (29)  99 (25)  
Replicated Model (Run 2) 
No. Coop. t-Value No. Def. t-Value 
65 F T T T T T T 795 (25) -1,54 83 (22) 2,63 
66 F T T T T T F 789 (24) -0,79 88 (22) 1,86 
67 F T T T T F T 804 (25) -2,92 73 (24) 4,07 
68 F T T T T F F 787 (29) -0,44 90 (26) 1,30 
69 F T T T F T T 872 (8) -15,92 12 (8) 18,25 
70 F T T T F T F 869 (12) -14,74 14 (12) 16,89 
71 F T T T F F T 868 (11) -14,86 16 (11) 16,84 
72 F T T T F F F 871 (10) -15,50 11 (8) 18,36 
73 F T T F T T T 723 (26) 8,63 166 (24) -10,61 
74 F T T F T T F 696 (26) 12,37 188 (24) -14,08 
75 F T T F T F T 735 (28) 6,68 156 (26) -8,57 
76 F T T F T F F 703 (25) 11,53 183 (23) -13,58 
77 F T T F F T T 874 (14) -15,32 25 (14) 14,17 
78 F T T F F T F 870 (12) -15,06 29 (12) 13,92 
79 F T T F F F T 875 (10) -16,21 24 (10) 15,23 
80 F T T F F F F 874 (11) -15,96 25 (10) 14,99 
81 F T F T T T T 799 (27) -2,12 80 (24) 3,05 
82 F T F T T T F 764 (26) 2,82 112 (24) -2,01 
83 F T F T T F T 797 (24) -1,91 80 (21) 3,12 
84 F T F T T F F 780 (25) 0,53 97 (22) 0,28 
85 F T F T F T T 870 (9) -15,49 13 (8) 17,90 
86 F T F T F T F 868 (11) -14,79 14 (10) 17,31 
87 F T F T F F T 867 (11) -14,59 17 (11) 16,56 
88 F T F T F F F 867 (14) -14,02 16 (13) 16,05 
89 F T F F T T T 710 (29) 10,03 178 (25) -12,26 
90 F T F F T T F 664 (25) 17,10 216 (22) -19,18 
91 F T F F T F T 712 (24) 10,49 177 (22) -12,70 
92 F T F F T F F 673 (35) 13,30 209 (31) -15,10 
93 F T F F F T T 873 (12) -15,42 26 (12) 14,39 
94 F T F F F T F 875 (11) -15,92 24 (11) 14,94 
95 F T F F F F T 870 (12) -14,85 29 (13) 13,62 
96 F T F F F F F 866 (13) -14,14 33 (13) 12,87 
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Table A‐2 continued: Results of the replication of Run 2 
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 Original Model (Run 2) 
No. Coop.  No. Def.  
784 (29)  99 (25)  
Replicated Model (Run 2) 
No. Coop. t-Value No. Def. t-Value 
97 F T T T T T T 769 (26) 2,05 107 (23) -1,21 
98 F T T T T T F 751 (26) 4,62 124 (24) -3,95 
99 F T T T T F T 773 (23) 1,61 103 (21) -0,66 
100 F T T T T F F 752 (26) 4,48 123 (24) -3,73 
101 F T T T F T T 861 (14) -13,13 21 (13) 15,14 
102 F T T T F T F 862 (13) -13,38 19 (13) 15,45 
103 F T T T F F T 860 (15) -12,66 21 (14) 14,83 
104 F T T T F F F 861 (13) -13,33 19 (11) 16,00 
105 F T T F T T T 684 (19) 15,76 202 (19) -18,09 
106 F F T F T T F 646 (23) 20,53 232 (20) -22,76 
107 F F T F T F T 681 (23) 15,20 203 (22) -17,10 
108 F F T F T F F 639 (34) 17,91 238 (28) -20,13 
109 F F T F F T T 867 (11) -14,64 32 (10) 13,50 
110 F F T F F T F 863 (14) -13,44 36 (14) 12,14 
111 F F T F F F T 865 (12) -14,15 34 (12) 12,95 
112 F F T F F F F 866 (17) -13,29 33 (17) 12,02 
113 F F F T T T T 769 (31) 1,98 108 (27) -1,28 
114 F F F T T T F 738 (29) 6,13 136 (28) -5,41 
115 F F F T T F T 757 (24) 3,87 117 (22) -2,93 
116 F F F T T F F 742 (29) 5,57 132 (26) -5,01 
117 F F F T F T T 863 (11) -13,93 20 (11) 16,03 
118 F F F T F T F 859 (16) -12,46 23 (15) 14,28 
119 F F F T F F T 856 (13) -12,46 25 (12) 14,53 
120 F F F T F F F 862 (13) -13,43 20 (13) 15,46 
121 F F F F T T T 664 (27) 16,51 218 (23) -19,11 
122 F F F F T T F 635 (27) 20,68 243 (24) -22,73 
123 F F F F T F T 669 (25) 16,60 216 (22) -19,34 
124 F F F F T F F 630 (27) 21,44 247 (23) -24,02 
125 F F F F F T T 864 (13) -13,81 35 (13) 12,58 
126 F F F F F T F 867 (13) -14,38 31 (13) 13,20 
127 F F F F F F T 861 (16) -12,66 38 (16) 11,32 
128 F F F F F F F 864 (11) -14,15 34 (11) 12,93 
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